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Abstract
In the realm of global governance, fragmentation is a recognized and recurrent feature 
and the multiple causalities underlying global governance issues along with their often 
cross-sectoral and cross-scale dynamics constitute major driving forces for fragmented 
governance. The article aims to identify the interactions between the elements of two 
regime complexes: climate and biodiversity. We argue that despite the different structur-
ation and history of climate and biodiversity regime complexes, the notion of Ecosystem 
services, in developing specific policy instruments such as payments for environmental 
services, contributes to the synergy of these two complexes regimes. Indeed, ES concept 
has been an “integrative” and “bridging” concept that facilitated the creation of linkages 
between climate and biodiversity regimes complexes. First, the international diffusion 
of the ecosystem services concept has been possible though bringing organizations in-
volved in both regimes complexes. Second, the market based instruments for ecosystem 
services and biodiversity, especially payment for environmental services has been the op-
erational setting that enables to create at national and/or local scales the operational syn-
ergies between both issues and regimes. Payment for environmental services can achieve 
jointly biodiversity conservation and some mitigation and adaptation objectives. 
Keys words: Governance, Environmental, Climate regimes, Biodiversity regimes, 
Ecosystem services.
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Resumen 
En el ámbito de la gobernanza global, la fragmentación es una característica reconocida y 
recurrente. Las múltiples causalidades subyacentes en los desafíos de la gobernanza global, así 
como las dinámicas inter-sectoriales e inter-escalas, constituyen las mayores fuerzas impulsoras 
de esta gobernanza fragmentada. Este artículo tiene como objetivo identificar las interacciones 
entre los elementos de dos complejos de régimen: el complejo de régimen climático y el de 
biodiversidad. A pesar de las diferencias de procesos de estructuración e dinámicas históricas 
de los complejos de régimen climático y de biodiversidad, la noción de servicios eco-sistémicos 
y el desarrollo de instrumentos de tipo pago por servicios ambientales, han contribuido para 
crear sinergias entre estos dos regímenes. El concepto de servicios eco sistémicos ha sido un 
concepto “integrador” y “de enlace”, que ha facilitado la creación de vínculos entre los regíme-
nes climáticos y de biodiversidad. Primero, la difusión internacional del concepto de servicio 
eco-sistémico ha sido posible reuniendo organizaciones que participaban de los dos regíme-
nes. Segundo, los instrumentos de mercado para servicios eco-sistémicos y biodiversidad, en 
particular los pagos por servicios ambientales, han constituido el dispositivo operacional que 
permitió crear a nivel nacional y/o local, sinergias operativas entre los dos desafíos y regímenes. 
El pago por servicios ambientales permite juntar/reunir objetivos de conservación de la biodi-
versidad y de mitigación e adaptación al cambio climático.
Palabras clave: Gobernanza, Servicios ambientales, Regímen de clima, Regímen de biodi-
versidad, Servicios ecosistémicos.
Introduction
In the realm of global governance, environmental issues are fragmented in several 
regimes such as climate, biodiversity, water and desertification. The idea of an in-
ternational regime, defined in broad terms as “norms, rules, and procedures agreed 
to in order to regulate an issue-area” (Haas 1980), has led to numerous studies on 
international governance with respect to three general questions: the emergence of 
regimes, their effectiveness, and the transformation of their forms of governance 
(Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 1997). The question of interdependence between agree-
ments and institutions has occupied studies from early on: E. Hass points out that 
“Nowadays, governments recognize complex cause-and-effect linkages between is-
sues they once considered as distinct” and reignites the idea of “complex interde-
pendence” to highlight the complex and tangled mass of questions that States and 
international organizations seek to manage at the international level (Haas 1980). 
More recently, Orsini, Morin, & Young defined a regime complex “as a network 
of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; 
exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative 
interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed 
effectively” (Orsini, Morin et al. 2013).
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As environmental issues are complex and interlinked, fragmentation of regime 
complex that are addressing these issues may hinder effective management and 
solution to address them, creating overlap, tension, leading to an inefficiency of 
regulation proposed (Biermann, Pattberg et al. 2009; Van Asselt 2011; Zelli and 
van Asselt 2013). Whereas climate change (CC) and biodiversity are part of envi-
ronmental issues, some antagonism is prone to appear.
Hence, this article aims to identify the interactions between the elements of two 
regime complexes: climate and biodiversity 1  In the realm of global governance, 
fragmentation is a recognized and recurrent feature (Biermann, Pattberg et al. 
2009), and the multiple causalities underlying global governance issues along with 
their often cross-sectoral and cross-scale dynamics constitute major driving forces 
for fragmented governance. However, the concept of regime complex (Keohane 
and Victor 2010) allows us to look beyond this apparent fragmentation and take 
into account the different elements at the global level and at the local level which 
contributes to the cooperation between regime complex. We argue that despite the 
different structuration and history of climate and biodiversity regime complexes, 
the notion of ecosystem services (ES), in developing specific policy instruments 
such as payments for environmental services (PES), contributes to the synergy of 
these two complexes regimes. 
In the first part, thanks to the concept of regime complex and its relevance to 
understand global environmental governance, we examine the emergence and dy-
namic of these two regime complexes, climate and biodiversity. In the second part, 
we discuss the interaction modalities between regime complexes through the gene-
sis of ecosystem services concept, his promoters and the market based instruments 
which are developed to foster provision of ES. 
Part1: Emergence and structuration of the climate and biodiversity 
regime complexes
The concept of regime complex in global environmental governance and 
methods
The multiplication of agreements, regimes, and institutions as well as the interven-
tions of an increasing number of different actors (state and non-state actors, transna-
1 Most of the theoretical part of this article was presented and discussed during the 8th Pan – European Confer-
ence on International Relations, in 2013. Hrabanski, M; Pesche, D., Fragmentation, circulation, and regime 
complexes : the network of experts and organizations at the interface between climate and biodiversity, 8th 
Pan – European Conference on International Relations, One International Relations or Many? Multiple 
Worlds, Multiple Crises, 18-21 septembre 2013, Warsaw (Poland).
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tional actors…) in global governance lead certain studies to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the complicated dynamics of interdependence, fragmentation and 
coherence of regime complex. At this point, fragmentation is fully recognized as a re-
current feature of global environmental governance (Biermann, Pattberg et al. 2009). 
According to the authors, analyzing the fragmentation is a way to develop a research 
agenda on global governance architectures rooted in the earlier works on interlocking 
institutions, and more recent works on the interplay or overlap between international 
institutions or regimes (Biermann, Pattberg et al. 2009). 
The multiple causalities underlying global governance issues, often cross-sec-
toral and cross-scales in nature are major factors behind the forces driving this 
fragmentation of governance involving the interactions between various networks, 
institutions, values, and norms. Biermann and his colleagues set out to differenti-
ate three types of fragmentation: synergic, cooperative, and conflictive (Biermann, 
Pattberg et al. 2009). 
To characterize the CC and biodiversity regime complexes, we first carried out 
a review of scientific literature and documents including legal texts (conventions...) 
and document related to international organizations, governments and non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) participation and positioning within the CC and bio-
diversity regime. This information was processed to analyze the dynamics of complex 
regime using as a framework the proposal of Young (1998) who showed (on the Artic 
accords) that overall process of regime formation can be address considering three 
(development) stages: agenda formation, negotiation, and operationalization. This 
information was also used to capture the degree of fragmentation of the regimes. For 
that purpose, we characterized the three components of the regime complex: i) the 
agreement component, that we grasp through the number of international conven-
tions related to the issue, ii) the science component that we characterize through an 
analysis of the science policy interface of the regime (Hrabanski and Pesche 2016; 
Vadrot 2016), which capture the scientific community structuration that feed the de-
cision process in the regime, and iii) the operational component, we capture through 
the number and nature of specific protocol to operationalize the agreements (conven-
tions). In a third phase, analyzing document and actors’ networks involved in both 
regimes, we derived the interactions among them. This analysis was supported with 
some interviews of actors involved in both regimes and some ethnographic survey, es-
pecially within the recent Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES2) meetings. 
2  The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) is an indepen-
dent intergovernmental body, established by member States in 2012. It provides policymakers with objective 
scientific assessments about the state of knowledge regarding the planet’s biodiversity, ecosystems and the benefits 
they provide to people, as well as the tools and methods to protect and sustainably use these vital natural assets.
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Additionally, we analyzed the ES concepts genesis and diffusion, based on lit-
erature review and complementary interviews of actors involved in ES diffusion 
process at international level. Furthermore, we review evidence of implementation 
of payment of environmental services schemes to grasp their capacity in achieving 
jointly climate and biodiversity goals, and thus participating in this way to bring 
closer these two regimes. 
The unified and linear climate regime complex
It has become trite to point out that global warming or climate change is a world-
wide problem, and the climate regime complex is fairly unified as compared to 
the more recent regimes of biodiversity. Additionally, dynamic of climate regime 
appears to be linear and follow the three stages of regime development proposed by 
Young (Young 1998): agenda formation, negotiation and operationalization.
Andresen and Agrawala (2002), contend that the agenda formation period of 
the climate regime extends from the late 1950s to the start of intergovernmental 
negotiations in early 1991. In this first stage, the creation of the IPCC (1988) is an 
achievement, and it makes up one of the three essential elements of the climate re-
gime complex (Paterson 1993; Dahan Damedico and Guillemot 2006; Encinas de 
Munagorri 2009). The second or “negotiation stage” begins in 1991 with the adop-
tion of the Climate Convention and continues (UNFCCC) until the adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. The UNFCCC along with the subsequent 
Conferences of the Parties (COP) constitute the base of world governance for the 
climate. In the convention framework adopted in 1992, the goal of a reduction 
of greenhouse gases is established and will lead to commitments to actual num-
bers. The third stage of “operationalization” is achieved beginning in 1997 with the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The protocol attempts to secure the commitments 
made in the UNFCCC by putting in place the mechanisms known as Flexibility 
Mechanisms3 (Schneider 1998; Tietenberg 2003; Goers, Wagner et al. 2010). After 
Kyoto, and following the failure of the conference in Copenhagen, that was meant 
to reorganize terms for a second agreement, the Paris agreement, in 2015. The 
3 Rather than set up a system of taxes, the Kyoto Protocol put in place economic incentives in the form of two 
types of mechanisms which are different but unified by the creation of a carbon unit as the means of exchange: 
carbon emissions trading by the States, and two project-based mechanisms, the clean development mechanism 
(CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). Supported by the US, this scheme was first considered with extreme 
prudence by the Europeans before becoming its principal defenders after the turn of the century. In the end, 
the Unvoiited States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol when the Senate legislature determined that it hurt US 
competitiveness against emerging countries that would not have the constraint of limiting their emissions under 
the Kyoto framework.
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agreement is based on a bottom up, voluntary process of commitment of coun-
tries (in form of “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, INDC), and a 
regulation based on cooperation principles (Caron and Treyer 2015; Okereke and 
Coventry 2016)
Although the climate regime complex may interact with other regime com-
plexes (commerce, biodiversity), it remains nevertheless a regime complex that is 
unified around a single convention, and structured around three essential elements 
: a single convention (UNFCCC), a single science policy interface (IPCC) and 
some operational elements (Kyoto protocol then Paris Agreement). Consequently, 
climate regime complex is less fragmented than the biodiversity regime complex. 
The fragmented biodiversity regime complex
Few works attempt to understand the biodiversity regime complex as a whole since 
the complex is scattered among several sub-groups, all of which address specif-
ic dimensions of biodiversity while still being conducted to deal with the same 
themes (Le Prestre 2004; Velázquez Gomar 2013; Gomar, Stringer et al. 2014; Le 
Prestre and Compagnon 2016). In addition, the creation of the biodiversity regime 
complex has not followed a linear evolution, leaving little relevance to Young’s the-
ory on the construction of regimes (Young, 1998). Above all, several International 
Conventions on different biodiversity topics were ratified before the famous Con-
vention of biological diversity (1992), that is why the biodiversity regime complex 
is characterized by its fragmentation.
Historically, well-known scientists begin to draw attention in the late 1970s to a 
mounting concern over the extinction of species(Carson 2002). But it is the middle 
of the 1980s before the “biodiversity crisis” (Takacs 1996) that it becomes a focus 
for the media, leaders, and the general public opinion through the emergence and 
diffusion of the neologism, “biodiversity” (as a contraction of biology and diversity).
In 1992, although the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) could be 
considered as offering an encompassing framework for biodiversity questions, it is 
primarily concerned with regulatory questions of access to genetic resources, espe-
cially through the 2000 complementary agreement on biosecurity (the Carthage 
Protocol, and later the Nagoya Protocol of 2010). Thus the questions of genetic re-
source management take precedence over the questions of natural habitat and spe-
cies conservation (Boisvert and Vivien 2010).  Today, there are more than 150 mul-
tilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) related to biodiversity, some regional 
and some global, some issue-related, others general. Some of the most important 
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ones, from a conservation perspective, are the Convention on the Conservation 
of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention), the Convention 
concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC), 
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (IT-
PGRFA) and finally the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), a group of 
MEAs often referred to as the “biodiversity cluster”. Of course, the biodiversity 
complex extends across scales, with its vertical interactions with the more or less 
integrated national biodiversity policies, as much as horizontal interplay between 
MEAs (Anderson 2006; Gomar, Stringer et al. 2014; Gomar 2016). Given the 
growing importance of transnational governance initiatives, in particular public/
private partnerships in sustainable forestry, wildlife conservation, it is important 
to include non-state actors. Their role is much broader and farther reaching than 
being mere observers in the conferences of parties and other international negotia-
tions, although their participation in these forums is far from anecdotic (Orsini and 
Compagnon 2011; Orsini 2014). Lots of NGOs, for are some strong supporter of 
many MEAs at an early stage, including the CBD, and plays a role in monitoring 
their implementation (Hrabanski, Bidaud et al. 2013). 
The climate and biodiversity regimes complexes: two different 
histories and structuration
The structuration and histories of climate and biodiversity regimes complexes are re-
ally different. The first one is unified around a single convention (UNFCCC)° and 
structured around three main elements : a convention, a science policy interface and 
some agreements. On the contrary, biodiversity complex regime is fragmented be-
tween several conventions and several protocols. Even though the UNFCCC and 
the CBD are both signed in 1992, the climate regime complex simply acquires an 
implementation instrument from the decisions of the COP of the UNFCCC. In the 
biodiversity regime complex, two protocols come later with the signature in 2000 of 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, then 
the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity, but these protocols only covered a specific dimension of biodiversity questions.
Concerning science policy interface, in the climate complex regime, the IPCC 
was established in 1988, and has produced general and special reports on global 
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warming. It will inspire subsequent creations the Millennium ecosystem assessment 
(MA) between 2001 and 2005. The MA is an important step in the process of the 
unification of multilateral agreements dealing with biodiversity that finally suc-
ceeds in 2012 with the creation of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) based on the model of the IPCC. 
Despite some the interconnection between climate change and biodiversity re-
garding actors involvement (e.g. United Nation Environmental Program - UNEP) 
and a specific initiative, REDD+ that comes from the climate regime complex but 
integrates biodiversity concern4 , these two issues remained mainly address sepa-
rately within /through two regime complexes with very different history and struc-
ture (table 1). 
4 REDD+ is an initiative to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and foster conserva-
tion, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. Negotiation on REDD+ 
were launched in the framework of UNFCCC during Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change held in 2005 (COP-11) but although international negotiation did not 
come up with international agreement, many multilateral and bilateral funds and programs has been created 
and implemented such as Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank, or  the UN-REDD 
programme (Corbera and Schoeder 2011 (Corbera, E. and H. Schroeder (2011). “Governing and implement-
ing REDD+.” Environmental Science & Policy 14(2): 89-99.)
Table 1. Characteristics of climate and biodiversity complex regime
Component of the complex 
regime 
Climate complex 
regime
Biodiversity complex 
regime
Agreement component 
(Convention)
A unique convention: 
CNUCCC  (1992)
Multiple conventions:  
CDB (1992), Ramsar, 
(1971)
CITES (1973), CMS 
(1979)
Science component (Science 
policy interface) IPCC (1988) IPBES (2012)
Operationalization component 
(protocol)
Successive : 
Kyoto protocol (1997);  
Paris agreement (2015)
Fragmented: 
Nagoya Protocol (2010), 
Cartagena Protocol (2000)
Source: authors based on bibliographical review.
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Part 2: Ecosystem services concept in favor of the synergy of the climate 
and biodiversity regime complexes 
While climate and biodiversity complexes followed different paths, we argue that 
the notion of ecosystem services (ES), in developing specific policy instruments 
such as payments for environmental services, contributes to the synergy of these 
two complexes regimes. More precisely, three drivers, derived from the genesis of 
ES concept, contribute to the synergy of the two complex regimes studied. First, 
the global framing of this concept participates to bring closer biodiversity and cli-
mate change issues. Secondly, some actors who diffused the ES concept are involved 
in the two complex regimes and act as international brokers in transferring norms 
between these two complex regime (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996) . Thirdly, the ten-
dency to address ES through ES valuation and operationalize it through market 
mechanisms, especially payment for environmental services (PES) creates some 
synergy between both complex regimes, because PES can achieve jointly biodiver-
sity conservation and some mitigation and adaptation objectives. 
Ecosystem services concept, a global concept beyond biodiversity
Since the 1992 Rio summit, global environmental changes have become a grow-
ing preoccupation and global scientific assessments have become more and more 
frequent. These assessments, like the Millennium ecosystem assessment (2001-
2005), can be regarded as a formal effort to assemble selected knowledge in order 
to make them publicly available in a form useful for decision making (Mitchell, 
Clark, Cash, & Dickson, 2006). In this way, at the end of the 1990’s, the MA 
sponsors shared the conviction that highlighting the idea that ecosystems pro-
duce services was a strong argument for changing decision makers’ thinking with 
regard to the growing environmental degradation which by then was receiving 
increasing attention from the media. They argued that to improve human well-
being, four categories of ecosystem services: the supporting services (e.g. nutrient 
cycling, soil formation), provisioning services (e.g. food, timber, fuel), regulat-
ing services (e.g. climate, flood regulation), and cultural services (e.g. recreation) 
must be taken into account. 
The evolution of the science-policy interface on the issue of ES seems to follow 
the same trend as with climate change. Often presented as the biodiversity equiva-
lent of the IPPC initiatives and the Stern report, the MA (2005) and IPBES (2012) 
have contributed to steer policy on conservation and sustainable management of 
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biodiversity towards various means of economic regulation (Vadrot 2014; Hrabans-
ki and Pesche 2016; Vadrot 2016). In this way, the notion of ES as a simple indica-
tor that can be easily incorporated into public policy, practical provisions, corporate 
strategies (Godard and Hommel 2005; Boudia and Pestre 2016; Hrabanski 2017) 
and international institutions5, but more broadly, the ES concept seems to offer a 
broader frame to address environmental issues. In other words, if the international 
community in charge of the biodiversity agenda wants a means of measurement, as 
climate change issues are presented from the standpoint of tons CO2, ES concept 
proposes a global framing for all environmental issues, including climate change 
considered as a regulating services. 
In this way, the ES concept enables to go beyond the fragmentation of the 
international arenas on environmental issues. More precisely, ES had become a 
boundary concept (Kull, de Sartre et al. 2015) and is a key concept in biodiversity 
regime complex (including CC) and has been diffused in the climate regime com-
plex, thanks to several types of organizations.  
Organizations implicated in the two regimes
In the view of the MA’s promoters, the involvement of international conventions 
and intergovernmental organizations should, by extension, help to raise govern-
ments’ awareness and influence policy on environmental complex regimes. After 
2005 and the publication of the MA reports, UNEP, the CBD and other UN 
agencies were important channels for the MA promoters’ work of spreading the 
concept of ES. 
Michonski and Levi show that it is possible to identify 7 large categories of 
entities that are mobilized in the climate regime complex: 1. institutions focused 
on the environment, 2. informal leader forums, 3. sectoral institutions, 4. institu-
tions focused on energy, 5. (non-banking) development institutions, 6. Multilat-
eral and development banks 7. Other institutions such as the WTO (Michonski 
and Levi 2010).
Taking inspiration from this classification, we identify the types of entities 
that are present in both biodiversity and climate regime complexes. In both re-
gimes, we identify environmental institutions, such as the UNEP, development 
institutions such as FAO and WFP, multilateral development banks, such as 
5  See also the growing concern on indicators and measuring biodiversity (for instance United Kingdom par-
liament, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/postpn312.pdf, ; the private sector and NGO’s : http://
www.businessandbiodiversity.org/what_is_measuring.html, ; see also the 3rd chapter of the TEEB on the use 
of indicators.
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World Bank, and other institutions like the WTO. However, the two complexes 
do not involve the same informal leader forums, or sectoral institutions. More 
over energy institutions are not involved in biodiversity regime complex as they 
are in climate one. 
Nevertheless, there are other actors and organizations participating in both 
complexes. The work of Yamin and Depledge also identifies countries or groups of 
countries, and NGOs (noting the large families: environmental NGOs, business 
and industry associations, local authorities, indigenous associations, NGOs tied to 
research)(Yamin and Depledge 2004).
Combining this work produces a typology of the organizations present in both 
the climate regime complex and the biodiversity complex based on the following 
categories:
1. Institutions specialized on the environment such as the UNEP
2. Non-banking development institutions (FAO, WFP)
3. Multilateral development banks  (World Bank, BID…)
4. Other institutions such as the WTO
5. Countries and groups of countries such as G77, G20…
6. NGOs (environmental NGOs, NGOs tied to research, business NGOs, indig-
enous associations, and NGOs tied to local authorities
7. Research organisms (universities, research centers)
Found at the interface between the two regimes, these 7 types of organizations 
participate in the circulation of the norms and public policy models between 
regimes, especially market based instruments such as payment for environmental 
services.  
Payment for environmental services: a policy instrument in favor of the 
synergy of climate and biodiversity
Among the MA’s most significant contributions were to propose an analytical 
framework incorporating ES, now embedded in the literature and public policy, 
and to draw the international community’s attention to the monetary value of eco-
systems. The main event illustrating this trend is the emergence of The Economics 
of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) initiative in 2008. Building on the conclu-
sions of the MA, Pavan Sukhdev proposes to continue to raise the alarm about the 
global loss of ES by valuing them in monetary terms. The first step (TEEB, 2008) 
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was to assess the state of knowledge on the monetary value of ecosystems, show how 
some policies run counter to sustainable management of ES and list the economic 
instruments best able to help conserve them. This gradual incorporation of the ES 
concept in international arenas and national policies has also been facilitated by the 
tendency to put ES together with valuation of ES and the introduction of market 
mechanisms, especially payment for environmental services. 
Payment for environmental services is an instrument whose primary purpose is 
to channel multiple stakeholders’ efforts into financing and implementing an eco-
system protection scheme. While initially proposed and emphasized as a transaction 
between ES providers and users (Wunder 2005), the power of coordination and col-
lective learning is emphasized by many authors and shows how PES can make users 
and suppliers of environmental services aware of the importance of optimal man-
agement of the natural resources they depend on (Muradian, 2013). In that way, 
PES helps to enhance various stakeholders’ adaptability by building their capacity 
for socio-environmental action and innovation (van de Sand, 2012). In addition, 
their environmental objectives relate to services that either directly promote climate 
change mitigation through the carbon sequestration and reduction of greenhouse 
gases  emissions, or have an indirect impact in that they improve the adaptability 
of ecological and human systems (Ezzine-de-Blas, Hrabanski et al. 2016) . It is also 
clear that they contribute to foster CC adaptability (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Locatelli 
et al. 2011; van de Sand 2012) as they contribute to hydrological regulation, mul-
tifunctionality of agriculture, and thus enhance the resilience of socioecosystems. 
At global level, Strassburg et al (2010) showed a strong association between carbon 
stocks and species richness, suggesting that many areas of high value for biodiversity 
could be protected by carbon-based conservation system. Considering data from 
85 countries, Busch et al 2011 showed that reduction in deforestation incentivized 
by a REDD+ mechanism has the potential to greatly reduce the extinction rate 
of forest species, and concluded that elements of REDD+ that are most effective 
for climate change mitigation also offer the greatest benefits for biodiversity. At 
country level, Locatelli et al (2013), based on a thorough spatial evaluation of ES 
provision in Costa Rica, evidenced that areas under PES program are providing 
both biodiversity and carbon sequestration, concluding at synergy results between 
biodiversity and CC related objectives. Furthermore, PES design and implemen-
tation is prone to create dialogue between national institutions oriented toward 
conservation and CC oriented community. Indeed in most of the existing PES in 
Latin America (Costa Rica, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil,…), PES building process has 
been the results of interaction between forest conservation interests groups and 
institutions (often driven by biodiversity concern), wood planting interests groups 
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and institutions more concern by climate change issues, and/or actors concerned by 
water conservation issues (Ezzine de Blas, Le Coq et al. 2017). Hence multiservice 
and multiple objective nature of PES makes them a binding tools between climate 
change and biodiversity conservation strategies.
However, while some authors highlight the synergies between CC and biodi-
versity which can be achieved through PES (Wendland, Honzák et al. 2010; Bus-
ch 2013), the integration of CC and biodiversity complex regimes through the 
operationalization of PES instruments is facing some limits. First, dominant PES 
schemes in operation are still mono ES specific and respond to specific objective. 
As shown in a recent meta-analysis of PES schemes worldwide, PES are distributed 
in three dominating clusters, that differs in term of objective and promoting actors: 
“agri-environmental public PES”, “NGO-led biodiversity PES”, and “private com-
mercial carbon PES” (Ezzine-de-Blas, Wunder et al. 2016). A recent review of Latin 
American PES schemes also shows that operational bundled PES are still a minority 
compared with water or carbon PES (Raes, Loft et al. 2016). Therefore, it’s worth 
to notice that specific CC mitigation oriented mechanisms may have negative im-
pacts on biodiversity (Strassburg et al, 2010). As spatial distribution of carbon se-
questration and biodiversity services is uneven as in the case of Costa Rica, if CC 
mitigation instruments are applied strictly from a carbon maximization viewpoint, 
it may not protect the forests that provide the greatest benefits in terms of biodi-
versity (Locatelli et al, 2013). An often-cited example for trade-offs between car-
bon sequestration and biodiversity is the establishment of fast-growing tree species, 
such as eucalyptus, which might not only replace more biodiversity-rich habitat 
but could also have implications for the water table, thus increasing the sensitivity 
of the system to drought (Van de Sand, 2012). Secondly, while being a promissory 
way to synergic operationalization of CC and biodiversity conservation agendas, 
bundled PES are prone to experience tensions among objectives during their im-
plementation. For example, while the iconic Costa Rican PES program do integrate 
the promotion of four environmental services (biodiversity, climate change, water 
and scenic beauty), tensions appears in the implementation regarding the modality 
of action of PES as the results diverging views and interests of stakeholders involved 
in its governance, especially between actors oriented toward biodiversity conserva-
tion goals and thus promoting conservation and ecological restauration of forest , 
and actors interested in wood production and supportive mitigation climate change 
goals (Le Coq, Froger et al. 2015). 
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Conclusion
As facing complex and interlinked environmental issues may be jeopardized by the 
fragmented nature of environmental regime, synergies between regime complexes is a 
key issue. As part of environmental regimes, CC and biodiversity issues have been fol-
lowed different dynamics and exhibit contrasted fragmentation level. Hence, in con-
trast with climate regime complex, biodiversity regime complex followed a nonlin-
ear dynamics and is more fragmented. Whereas climate regime had integrated some 
biodiversity concerns (e.g. though REDD+), synergies between both regimes derived 
from initiatives related to biodiversity regimes following the creation, promotion and 
diffusion of ES concept. Indeed, ES concept has been an integrative and bridging 
concept that facilitated the creation of linkages between climate and biodiversity re-
gimes complexes. Indeed, ES concept and derived frameworks integrated CC issue 
(as regulation services) within biodiversity concerns. The diffusion of the ES concept 
has been possible though bringing organizations involved in both regimes complexes 
such as international organization and NGOs. Finally, the market based instruments 
for ES and biodiversity has been the operational setting that enables to create at na-
tional and/or local scales the operational synergies between both issues and regimes. 
Indeed, whether mono-services specific PES are blooming, multiservice and bundled 
PES are instruments to deal with both CC and biodiversity issues. 
However, even if synergies between climate and biodiversity regimes are facilitated 
by PES at international, national and even local level, some limitations still difficult 
to transcend, such as the trade-off between ES (especially between climate regulation 
services and biodiversity objectives among PES), and the tensions that it creates in the 
operationalization of PES. Furthermore, the growing interest for biodiversity offsets 
shows the analogy between climate market-based instruments such as REDD and the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and biodiversity compensation. In this way, 
biodiversity offsetting is a promise to replace nature destroyed and lost in one place 
with nature somewhere else (Hrabanski 2015; Lapeyre, Froger et al. 2015). As with 
schemes for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), 
biodiversity offsetting is a way to “pretend you can trade places”. Yet in the scientific 
community, economists, geographers and ecologists, are insisting that there are risks 
and limits to the monetary evaluation of biodiversity and the reduction of damage 
evaluations to compensation based solely on the market mechanisms. On the other 
side, expectation from carbon market has been disappointing. These limitations and 
criticisms of market based instruments may reduce their capacity to link both regimes. 
Indeed, some hesitation on the international scene can be seen. In a FAO report(FAO 
2011) in which biodiversity and carbon compensation was thoroughly addressed, the 
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techniques and strategies proposed are varied and not limited to monetary or market 
valuations. Furthermore, non-market mechanisms such as collective action and regu-
lation are gaining back interests in international and local debates. The emergence of 
these new trends, that could either contribute to create new synergies or push toward 
more fragmentation, constitutes new challenges regarding interrelations within envi-
ronmental regimes complex.
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